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ADmu.ILTY-JOxES AcT-ELnCTION OF IE=DS.-The plaintiff, a sea-
man injured on the defendant's vessel, recovered wages, maintenance and
cure, and then sued at law for damages under section 33 of the Jones Act
[41 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 68 (1926) 3. Judgmqnt was given
for the plaintiff. Held, on certiorari to the Supreme Court, that recovery
in an action for wages, maintenance and cure was no bar to this action.
Judgment affirmed. The Admiral Dewey: Pacific S. S. Co. -e. Pctcrzon,
49 Sup. Ct 75 (U. S. 1923).
The right of an injured seaman to wages, maintenance and cure, regard-
less of negligence, is one of the established doctrines of admiralty. Harden
v. Gordon, Fed. Cas. No. 6047 (C. C. D. Ale. 1823); The Osccola, 1.9 U. S.
158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (1903). There is also the right to indemnity where
the injury is caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel or defective
appliances. Carlisle Packing Co. ,. Sandauzgcr, 259 U. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct.
475 (1922); cf. (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REv. 333. The Jones Act extended to
any injured seaman, "at his election," an action at law for damages. See
(1926) 20 Iii, L. REV. 156. The admiralty proceeding based on unsca-
worthiness and the action at law under the Jones Act are mutually exclusive,
both being in tort. West Cape; Baltmore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S.
316, 46 Sup. Ct. 348 (1927). Prior to the instant case a federal court has
held that a seaman, having elected to sue at law under the Jones Act,
could not amend to sue in admiralty for wages, maintenance and cure.
Western Front: Kdlman v. Fletcher Co., 20 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 3d,
1927); see Panaa.na Ry. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 380, 44 Sup. C. 391,
394 (1924); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 3G, 46 Sup. Ct. 410, 412
(1926). But there has also been authority to support the proposition
that the right to wages, maintenance and cure arises from the contract
of employment and is not indemnitory. See Hardoz v. Gorden, -zpra at
481; The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592, 595 (C. C. D. Mass. 1890). The
instant case establishes the rule that an action for wages, maintenance and
cure sounds in contract and does not exclude a subsequent tort action under
the Jones Act.
BILLS AND NOTES-PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DIsnONoRo-NEcEssiTY
WHERE INDORSER AS OFFICER OF CORPORATION PARTICIPATED IN PEEFEnEN-
ThA. TRANssn-Officers of a corporation, indorsers on its notes, partici-
pated in a preferential transfer to the defendant holder and thereby
obtained a release of the notes. The plaintiff, trustee for the bankrupt
corporation, sued to recover the preference. The defense claimed that the
surrender of the paper released the indorsers for failure to make present-
ment and give notice of dishonor, and that the defendant therefore became
a purchaser for value. Judgment was given for the defendant. Held,
on appeal, that by participating in the preferential payments, the indorsers
waived these requirements and the bank was therefore not a purchaser for
value since it had not lost its rights against the indorsers, which became
reinstated when the preference was set aside. Judgment reversed. Rol:-
wman v. Manufacturere' Trust Co., 27 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
That an indorser on a corporation's note is a director or officer of the
corporation does not ipso facto dispense with the necessity of presentment
and notice of dishonor. Keiser ,. Butte Creel: Consolidated Dredgi;g Co.,
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48 Cal. App. 38, 191 Pac. 552 (1920); Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1,
83 S. E. 692 (1914), ANN. CAS. 1917B 835; (1920) 5 MINN. L. RThv. 72.
But any additional circumstances may be seized upon to find a waiver.
Hull v. Myers, 90 Ga. 674, 16 S. E. 653 (1893) (indorsers, majority direc-
tors, knew that note could not be paid at maturity); J. W. O'Bannou Co.
v. Curran, 129 App. Div. 90, 113 N. Y. Supp. 359 (1st Dep't 1908) (indorsor
participated in corporation's bankruptcy proceedings); Bessenger v. Won-
zel, 161 Mich. 61, 125 N. W. 750, 27 L. R. A. (I;. s.) 516 (1910) (indorsers
assured holder that corporation would not pay note); Mercer v. Hydro.
carbon Converter Co., 205 App. Div. 78, 199 N. Y. Supp. 75 (1st Dop't
1923) (indorser sent corporation's renewal note); Verser v. Sterling Oil
& Refining Co., 89 Okla. 114, 213' Pac. 863 (1923) (indorser dishonored
note on behalf of corporation). Participation in the violation of a pref-
erential transfer statute by an officer, whereby the release of the note was
obtained, has been held to constitute a waiver. Wright v. Bank, 52
Misc. 214, 103 N. Y. Supp. 548 (Sup. Ct. 1907). But where the indorser
was not a director or officer, and not a party to the preferential transaction,
the creditor has been held to have lost his rights against the innocent
indorser, and thus to have become a purchaser for value. Wright V.
Bank, supra; Perry v. Van Norden Trust Co., 192 N. Y. 189, 84 N. E. 804
(1908). Two federal cases, apparently overruled by the instant decision,
made the Perry case the basis of their decisions where the indorsers con-
trolled the corporation and participated in the preferential transfer. How-
land v. Metropolitan Bank, 228 Fed. 542 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Grandison v.
Robertson, 231 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916). Regardless of the relationship
of director and corporation, such participation would seem to amount to
a waiver, for the indorser by his own conduct misled the holder and put
him off his guard, thus inducing him to omit the formalities of presentment
and notice of dishonor. Moll v. Roth Co., 77 Ore. 593, 152 Pac. 235
(1915); (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rav. 279.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-ILLEGAL CONTRACT-LIQUOR EXPORT TO THE UNITED
STATEs--Members of a British partnership engaged in shipping liquor
to the United States contracted among themselves for loans in furtherance
of their enterprise. In an action for breach of contract among them, held
(one Lord Justice dissenting), that the partnership was illegal and the
contract between the parties unenforceable, as such action would furnish
a just cause of complaint by the United States government. Foster v.
Driscoll, 45 T. L. R. 185 (1929).
A contract will not be enforced at the forum if it would be illegal In
the state of performance. Paine v. Morris, 26 Md. 46 (1866); of. Orm s
v. Dauchy, 82 N. Y. 443 (1880); Rosenbaum v. United State, Credit-Sys-
ten Co., 64 N. J. L. 34, 44 AtI. 966 (1899), rev'd, 65 N. J. L. 255, 48 Atl.
237 (1901). And a contract is invalid if in furtherance of a transaction
the ultimate purpose of which is to violate the laws of another country.
DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1927) 618; Walkerville Brewing Co.,
Ltd. v. Mayrand, [19281 4 D. L. R. 500 (lease of a pier in Canada for
shipping beer to the United States held illegal). But of. (1929) 42 HArv.
L. Rav. 436 (contending that the problem is one of proximate causation).
Thus courts will not recognize contracts to raise funds for a rebellion
against a friendly government. DeWiitz v. Hendricks, 2 Bing. 314 (1824).
And an action on a bond has been barred where it secured payment for
goods to be sold illegally in another country. Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos.
& P. 551 (1796). The degree of participation in the ultimate illegal trans-
action may have some bearing on the status of a party to a contract in
RECENT CASE NOTES
furtherance thereof. Bowman Distilling Co. v. AN'.tt, 34 Kan. 724 (ISSG)
(vender of liquor merely knew of vendee's purpose to make illegal resale;
action by former not barred) ; Gaylord v. Soragcn, 32 Vt. 110 (1859) (liquor
packed specially by vendor for illegal resale; action barred) ; Lightfoot v.
Tenant, supra. The English cases seem to indicate that an exception to
the general rule of invalidity is made where the contract is part of a trans-
action to violate the revenue laws of a foreign country. Dicny, loc. cit.
sutra; Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251 (1779) (insurance of goods
smuggled into France is valid) ; Shimeon v. Bazett, 2 M. & S. 94 (1813), af'd,
5 Taunt. 824 (1814) (insurance by neutral against risk of seizure by his
own government is valid). The above cases, however, involved the evasion
of revenue laws and the continental blockade primarily directed by France
against British commerce. In the instant case, on the other hand, policy
would tend wholly toward giving recognition to the laws of a friendly state.
CONSTITUTION.AL LAw-PoWER OF THE EXECUrIvE TO PADOT-CRXMNAL
CONTEPT.-The respondent was adjudged in contempt of court for having
published, in his annual report as head of the Anti-Saloon league, a
severe criticism of the judgments of the court in a number of liquor casez.
State v. Shuiaker, 157 N. E. 769 (Ind. 1927) (two judges dissenting).
The governor pardoned the prison sentence. The court issued a peremptory
writ to respondent to show cause why execution of the judgment should
not be ordered notwithstanding the governor's pardon. The respondent
demurred. Held (the same two judges d3.scidt g), that imprisonment for
the term be ordered. Demurrer overruled. State v. Shunal:cr, 164 N. E.
408 (Ind. 1928).
The constitution of Indiana provides that the governor shall have power
"to grant . . . pardons after conviction for all offenses except treason and
cases of impeachment." IND. CONST., art. 5, § 17. While conceding that
the contempt was criminal, the court held that it was not a crime because
no jury trial was given as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and because it
was not named as such by statute; the legislature having declared that
all crimes against the state should be so defined. Thus the contempt was
said not to be an "offense" within the meaning of the constitution. A
provision giving power to pardon in "all criminal cases" has been held not
to include criminal contempts. Taylor r'. Goodrich, 40 S. W. 515 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1897). But the term "offense" has been said to be more compre-
hensive. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 117, 45 Sup. Ct. 332, 336
(1924). The power has also been denied where the prisoner had violated
an injunction, secured by the Attorney General, forbidding the sale of
liquor. Ex parte Green, 116 Tex. 515, 295 S. W. 910 (1927) (reasoning
not clear; said to be "a violation of an order made in a civil case" to
which the power to pardon did not extend) ; Note (1927) 6 Tnx. L. Rav. 79.
The executive may not pardon a civil contempt. State v. Vcrage, 177 Wis.
295, 187 N. W. 830; People v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223, 137 N. E. 118 (1922);
see (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv. 176. With the exception of the Texas cases
and the instant case, where the question has been decided, the courts have
conceded the power of the executive to pardon what they found to be
criminal contempt. Ex parte Grossman, szpra; Ex parte Magee, 31 N.
M. 276, 242 Pac. .332 (1925) (direct contempt; see criticism (192G) 21
ILL. L. REv. 379); State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N. M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028
(1924) (indirect; constitution gives power to pardon "offenses") ; Sharp v.
State, 102 Tenn. 9, 49 S. W. 752 (1899) (contempt said to be a "public
offense"); Loui.sana v. Savvinet, 24 La. Ann. 119 (1872) (state said to
be the offended party); Ex parte Hickey, 4 S. M. 751 (Miss. 1840) (con-
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stitutional power to pardon "criminal and perlal cases"); see (1925) 24
MICH. L. REV. 189. It is argued that to concede the power would be
repugnant to the constitutional separation of powers; that it would make
the judiciary a dependent branch df government without power effectively
to perform its function. See In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 456 (C. C. A.
8th, 1902); State v. Verage, supra at 323, 187 N. W. at 824. But those
who concede it maintain that the pardoning power is needed as a check
against a harsh judgment as much where a person is convicted by a judge
without a jury, as where convicted in a jury trial. See Ex parte Grossman,
supra at 122, 45 Sup. Ct. at 337; Ex parte Magee, supra at 279, 242 Pac.
at 333. The fact that the power might be abused would seem to be no
reason for denying it. Over a period of eighty-five years the President
exercised the power twenty-seven times before it was sufficiently disputed
to force a decision on the question. See Ex parte Gr'ossman, supra at 118,
45 Sup. Ct. at 336. The instant case seems to have been one where the
executive check on the judiciary might well have been allowed, since the
constitutional provision would seem broad enough, and it was questionable
whether a contempt had been committed. See (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV.
210; (1927) 41 HARV. L. REV. 254.
CORPORATIONs-NoN-uUMULATIVE PREFERRE STOCK-DIVIDENDS.-The de-
fendant company's certificate of incorporation provided for five per cent,
non-cumulative, preferred stock. From 1915 to 1925 no dividends were
paid except for a partial dividend in 1917 of one per cent. Each year
earnings sufficient to cover a five per cent dividend were turned back into
the business for improvements and working capital. In 1927 and 1928,
having paid the full five per cent dividend, the directors proposed to
declaxe a dividend on junior preferred and common stock. Preferred
shareholders sought to enjoin the latter dividends until the omitted dividends
be made up on their stock. The lower court dismissed the bill. Held, on ap-
peal (one judge dissenting), that the injunction issue since the withholding
of dividends in years when earnings were sufficient resulted in granting divi-
dend credit which must be made good before dividends may be paid on
junior issues. Barclay v. Wabash R. R., 30 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
The policy of the instant decision aims to prevent the starvation of
preferred shareholders by directors in the hope of obtaining greater subse-
quent earnings for common shares. See Berle, Non Cumulative Preferrcd
Stock (1923) 23 Col,. L. REv. 358. The wording of the certificate of incor-
poration may be construed so as to impose a duty to declare dividends
on non-cumulative preferred stock if the current earnings are sufficient.
Burke v. Ottawa Gas Co., 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912). But usually
the right to such dividends depends, expressly or by construction, on a
declaration thereof by the directors. New York R. R. 'V. Nickals, 119 U. S.
296 (1886). In either case, if earnings be arbitrarily withheld, the share-
holder may require the declaration of dividends. Star Publishing Co. v.
Ball, 192 Ind. 158, 134 N. E. 285 (1922). In cases cited as authority for
the instant decision, it was held that common shareholders could not object
to the declaration of back dividends, earned but withheld, on non-cumulative
preferred stock. Wood v. Lary, 47 Hun 550 (N. Y. 1888); Bassett v.
United States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 At. 514 (1909);
Collins u. Portland Electric Power Co., 12 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A,. 9th,
1926); ef. Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126
Atl. 302 (1924) (holding, as in the instant case, that preferred shareholders
could enjoin the payment of common dividends while non-cumulative pre-
ferred dividends remained undeclared though earned in previous years).
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In the Wood case, however, the certificate of incorporation apparently gave
an absolute right to dividends if earned, and in the Day case the same
construction was made under section 18 of the New Jersey Corporation
Act. N. J. ComP. ST..T (1910) 1603. In the Bassett and Collins cases,
the withheld earnings were "available" in the form of unnecessary reserve
funds for working capital, accumulated from said earnings, which would
indicate that the motive for withholding them was not based upon neces-
sity, or that the necessity no longer existed. In the instant case, the
withheld earnings were represented by fixed improvements and worling
capital in use, the only "available" funds were subsequent earnings, and it
was admitted by both parties that the withholding of earnings was neces-
sary for the interests of the business. The possibility of a necessary
conversion of earnings into fixed assets would seem to be one of the risks
accepted by the non-cumulative preferred shareholder and more consistent
with the usual conception of non-cumulative stock.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE--PART PERFORMANCE AND THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS-MUTUALITY-The plaintiff orally agreed to sell his land to the
defendant, who paid part of the purchase price, entered into possession, and
planted an extensive garden. Subsequently the defendant abandoned the
premises, and on his refusal to complete the sale, the plaintiff successfully
sued for specific performance. Held, on appeal, inter alia, that part per-
formance by the defendant would not entitle the plaintiff-vendor to specific
performance. Judgment reversed. Palhumbo v. James, 164 N. E. 400 (Mass.
1929).
It is generally considered that the vendor's right to specific performance
of an oral contract for the sale of land is predicated on the doctrine of
mutuality, and exists where the vendee's part performance is sufficient to
entitle him to the remedy. Pearson v. Gardner, 202 Blich. 30, 168 N. W.
485 (1918); (1918) 17 MICH. L. REv. 193; see Seawnan v. A.chcrmann, 51
Wis. 678, 682, 8 N. W. 818, 820 (1331) ; PO,EROY, SPECIFIC PErFORnMANCE-
(3d ed. 1926) 301, n. § l18a. In many instances, the vendee's acts of part
performance have also involved a change of position on the part of the
vendor. Such acts might well be regarded as having the effect of part
performance by the vendor, thus obviating the necessity of invoking the
rule of mutuality as a reason for specific performance. Witt v. Boothe, 98
Kan. 554, 158 Pac. 851 (1916) (vendee paid part of purchase price, and
took possession); Cooper v. Thomason, 30 Ore. 161, 45 Pac. 295 (189G);
cf. Andrew v. Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 26 Atl. 715 (1893) (rule of mutuality
stated as a reason for specific performance; vendor altered the premises).
The instant case, however questionable in result, finds some support in an
earlier Massachusetts case. See Barnes v. Boston & Maine R. R., 1,30 Mass.
388, 390 (1881). And it is in accord with the Massachusetts policy in re-
fusing specific performance of an oral contract to buy land in the absence
of circumstances approaching fraud on the plaintiff. Note (1904) 13
HARv. L. REV. 137.
EVIDENCE---CRImiNAL LAw-ADussIiLrl OF OTHER OFFESES WHEN
JuRY HAS DISCnnrloN IN FIXING PUNISHMENT-The defendants confessed
to a robbery and prior crimes including a murder committed in the course
of a burglary; in all of which the same pistol was used. On trial for the
murder these confessions were admitted in whole over defendant's objection
to portions relating to the subsequent robberies. Convicted of first degree
murder, three of the defendants were sentenced to death, under a statute
permitting the jury to assess punishment at either life imprisonment or
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death. Held on appeal, that the judgments be affirmed, partly because there
was a slight evidentiary connection between the murder and the other
crimes, and partly because these subsequent crimes might properly influence
the discretion of the jury in assessing punishment. Commonwealth t'.
Parker, 143 Atl. 904 (Pa. 1928).
The general principle, as usually phrased, is that other offenses of the
accused are not admissible in evidence except as they tend to prove identity,
system or course of conduct, intent, motive, or guilty knowledge. People
v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901) ; Wehcnkel v. State, 218 No
W. 137 (Neb. 1928). It is not enough that they show bad character.
(1913) 26 HARv. L. REV. 656. In the case of confessions, if admissions of
other offenses are so interwoven with pertinent matter that a separation
would destroy the probative value of the latter, the whole confession is
admissible, the jury being instructed to disregard the irrelevant portions.
People v. Loomis, 178 N. Y. 400, 70 N. E. 919 (1904) ; of. Barnett lo. State,
50 Tex. Cr. 538, 99 S. W. 556 (1907) (applying same rule of exclusion to
confessions as to other evidence of other acts). Moreover the question of
admissibility is to a great degree left to the discretion of the trial judge.
Eagles v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 546 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1928). In the
instant case a statute permitted the jury, on finding the defendants guilty
of first degree murder, to exercise their discretion in assessing punishment
in the same verdict at either life imprisonment or death. Pa. Laws 1925,
759. The purpose of the statute was merely to enable juries to soften the
effect of a verdict of first degree murder where evidence admissible under
then existing rules revealed extenuating circumstances. (1925) 8 PA. LEa.
JOUR. 2147; ibid. 2893. Where the jury has this discretion in assessing
punishment there is all the more reason for excluding evidence of other
offenses. People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N. E. 214 (1911); People to.
Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915). But the court in the instant case,
taking judicial notice of the prevalence of habitual offenders, illustrates a
correlation between crime, waves and relaxation of the rules of evidence.
For a similar relaxation in England of the rule against admitting other
offenses see Rex v. Chesshire, 20 Cr. App. R. 47 (1927); (1928) 44 L. Q.
REv. 1.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES OF REAL ESTATE-INTENT AS A QUESTION OF
FAcT.-The defendant conveyed land without consideration, and thereby
rendered himself insolvent. The plaintiff, a creditor at the time of the
conveyance, sought to have the transfer set aside as fraudulent, but was
denied relief. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be remanded and the con-
veyance set aside, on the ground that the defendant must be deemed to have
intended the natural consequences of her act which hindered, delayed and
defrauded her creditors and so was fraudulent in fact within a statute
[MONT. R . STAT. (1921) § 8606] providing that fraudulent intent in such
cases is a question of fact, not of law. National Bank of Anaconda v.
Yegen, 271 Pac. 612 (Mont. 1928).
In some jurisdictions creditors may have a voluntary conveyance by a
debtor set aside, even though no "fraudulent intent" or insolvency is shown.
Wood v. Potts, 140 Ala. 425, 37 So. 253 (1903) ; cf. Gant v. Dunn, 110 So. 903
(Ala. 1927). The same result may be reached by holding that a voluntary
conveyance is conclusively presumed to be fraudulent against existing credi-
tors. Aliee v. Shay, 268 Pac. 962 (Cal. 1928) (by statute) ; of. Williams V.
Travis, 277 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). In many jurisdictions a volun-
tary conveyance merely raises a rebuttable presumption of fraud. Lynes
v. Holt, 1 S. W. (2d) 121 (Mo. 1927); see Russ v. Blaekshear, 88 Fla. 573,
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576, 102 So. 749, 750 (1925). Some courts require a showing of insolvency
at the time of the voluntary conveyance. Ncrcrs v. Hack, 138 Ind. 260, 37
N. E. 791 (1894) ; Czdp v. TrEnt, 99 Okla. 112, 226 Pac. 348 (1924). Others
have. held an allegation that the voluntary conveyance has rendered the
grantor insolvent sufficient to set aside the conveyance. Bcnson v. Harri-
man, 55 Cal. App. 483, 204 Pac. 255 (1921); Chamberlain v. Fay, 216 N.
W. 700 (Iowa 1927) (executor may set aside testator's conveyance) ; Alb e
-v. Shay, supra (one reducing tort claim to judgment after conveyance may
have it set aside). A voluntary conveyance made by a solvent debtor in
anticipation of insolvency will be set aside in favor of his trustee in bank-
ruptcy. Klinger v. Hyman, 223 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Jones v.
Williams, 94 Vt. 175, 109 Atl. S03 (1920) (possibility of insolvency foresee-
able). Imputed "motive" rather than "actual intent" appears to control in
these cases, undoubtedly because of the difficulty, of ascertaining "actual
intent." See Cal. Consol. Min. Co. v. Manley, 10 Idaho 786, 799, 81 Pac.
50, 53 (1905); Brady v. Irby, 101 Ark. 573, 581, 142 S. W. 1124, 1127
(1912). Under a statute similar to that in the instant case, a showing of
actual fraudulent intent has been required. Bzdl v. Bray, S9 Cal. 286, 26
Pac. 873 (1891). But legislative amendment soon followed. Alice v. Shay,
supra, at 968. A mere lack of consideration generally raises no presump-
tion of fraud under statutes of the instant type. Cf. McMillan v. McMillan,
42 Idaho 270, 245 Pac. 98 (1926); Vacumn Oil Co. v. Qzigg, 127 Okla. 61,
259 Pac. 858 (1927). But cf. Daris i. Davis, 20 Ore. 78, 25 Pac. 140 (1890).
And such statutes will not prevent a finding of "constructive" fraud. See
Leader Pub- Co. v. Grant Trist Co., 182 Ind. 651, 660, 108 N. E. 121, 124
(1915). Although the statutes would seem to require determination of the
subjective intent, the objective treatment in the instant case appears justi-
fiable to avoid fraud, perjury, and fruitless litigation.
LImmirTION or AcTIONS-BONDS-PERIOD APPLICABLE TO INTzrXST COV-
PONS.-In an action on interest coupons, which had been detached from
bonds and which indicated on their face that they represented interest ark.-
ing on said bonds, the defendant pleaded the six year statute of limitationw
for simple contracts, contending that the sixteen year period provided for
specialities was inapplicable. The lower court gave judgment for the de-
fendant. Held, on appeal (two judges disctztiang), that the judgment be
affirmed. Dickerson v. Wilkes-Barre & Hazclton R. R., 143 At. 618 (N. J.
1926).
In general, in determining what period of limitations is applicable to in-
terest coupons on bonds, the courts, contrary to the instant case, apply the
period prescribed for specialities, on the ground that the coupon merely
represents the interest obligation arising on the bond and that the addition
of the coupon to the bond does not change the nature of that obligation.
City of Le:..:ington r. Butler, 14 Wall. 282 (U. S. 1871); Cz'shman v. Board,
19 Minn. 295 (1872); Kelly v. Forty-Second St., M. & St. N. Ave. Ry., 37
App. Div. 500, 55 N. Y. Supp. 1096 (1st Dep't 1899) ; Prescott v. Williaar,-
port & N. B. Ry, 159 Fed. 244 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1908) ; McDowell v. NorM
Side Bridge Co., 251 Pa. 585, 97 Atl. 97 (1916); see California Trust Co. v.
Sierra Valley Ry., 158 Cal. 690, 694, 112 Pac 274, 276 (1910) ; cf. Tovtial,, r
v. City of Boulder, 13 Colo. 219, 22 Pac. 468 (1889) (new promise not under
seal held not to toll the statute as to coupon). In many respectF, however,
the addition of the coupon does change the legal incidents of the interest
obligation. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run at the date of
maturity of the coupons, rather than from the maturity date of the bond.
Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583 (U. S. 1874) (coupons detached); Anmy v.
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Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470 (1878) (coupons not detached); 1 WooD, LIIITA-
TIONS (4th ed. 1916) § 127; cf. Griffin v. Macon County, 36 Fed. 885 (C.
C. E. D. Mo. 1888) (action on coupons barred by limitations; interest repre-
sented thereby cannot be recovered by sueing on the bond for interest in-
dependently of the coupons). Contra: Ehret v. Price, 254 Pac. 748 (Okla.
1927); see Berkey v. Board of Com'rs, 48 Colo. 104, 115, 110 Pac. 197, 201
(1910). Where the bond is issued without coupons an action for interest
installments is not barred until the bond is barred. Ade so. Ade, 181 I11.
App. 577 (1913) ; WQOD, op. cit. supra, § 119d (3). Contra: May V. Ball,
108 Ky. 180, 56 S. W. 7 (1900) (statute of limitations begins to run as in-
terest becomes due). Interest by way of damages will accrue on an in-
terest coupon from the date of maturity of the coupon. Hamilton v. Wheel-
ing Public Service Co., 88 W. Va. 573, 107 S. E. 401 (1921). But interest,
as damages, will not run on unpaid interest installments on a non-coupon
bond, in the absence of an express agreement therefor. Boggess v. Goff,
47 W. Va. 139, 34 S. E. 741 (1899). Contra: Hall v. Scott, 90 Ky. 340, 13
S. W. 249 (1890). The instant case seems logically to be justified in treating
interest coupons as obligations separate and distinct from the bond.
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs-NoIcE BEFORE Surr-PLUAtINa.-The charter
of the defendant city provided that "No action or proceeding to recover or
enforce any claim against the city shall be brought until the expiration of
forty days after" presentation of the claim. The plaintiff sued for an in-
junction and for damages for injury caused its property by the improper
discharge of the city sewage. Held, that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to present the claim as required. The court also stated that, since
the injunctive relief sought was only incidental and the recovery of damages
"at law" was the main object of the action, a suit "in equity" would not lie.
Squaw Island Freight & T. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 133 Misc. 64, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 139 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
the requirement of notice and presentation of claims against municipal
corporations is of statutory creation. Cf. 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CO.-
PORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 2654; City of Globe v. Rabogliatti, 24 Ariz. 392,
210 Pac. 685 (1922) (ordinance requiring notice is inoperative). Such a re-
quirement furthers the policy of avoiding needless litigation by affording
an opportunity for settlement out of court. See City of Dallas t. Shous,
212 S. W. 633, 634 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919) ; 4 DILLON, MUNICIPAL ConRo-
RATIONS (5th ed. 1911) 2813. The statutes are strictly construed, being in
derogation of "common right." See City of San Antonio v. Pfeuffer, 216 S.
W. 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). They are not unconstitutional, how-
ever, as class legislation creating a distinction between municipal and pri-
vate corporations. O'Neil v. City of Richmond, 141 Va. 168, 126 S. E. 56
(1925); Frasch v. City of New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. IV. 121 (1915)
(even though the claim arises out of the performance of a private func-
tion) ; see (1927) 14 VA. L. REV. 138, 139. Contra: Borski v. City of Wake-
field, 215 N. W. 19 (Mich. 1927) (no notice necessary where injuries are
incidental to the conduct of a private business enterprise) ; ef. Marshall v.
Whatcom County, 255 Pac. 654 (Wash. 1927) ; Note (1028) 52 A. L. R. 639,
640. Judicial decisions of the necessity of notice in the particular case vary
with the construction of the statute involved. Cf. Steltz v. City of Wausaut,
88 Wis. 618, 60 N. W. 1054 (1894) (charter expressly including tort
claims); see MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra, § 2629. Where the language Is
not explicit the courts have difficulty in determining the exact scope of the
provision. Cf. Haley & Lang Co. v. City of Huron, 36 S. D. 6, 153 N. W.
891 (1915) ("accounts" does not include tort claims); Adams v. City of
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Modesto, 131 Cal. 501, 63 Pac. 1083 (1901) ("claim and demand" may in-
clude tort demands but requirement of "audit" excludes them); Kelly V.
City of Butte, 44 Mont. 115, 119 Pac. 171 (1911) ("person injured" re-
stricts provision to personal injuries; does not include injuriez to property).
A number of courts have not insisted on the statutory notice where active
malfeasance, rather than negligence, was involved. Ni.,nou, r. Village of
Mapleton, 144 Minn. 60, 174 N. W. 517 (1919); City of Port nozuth v.
Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S. E. 781 (1926) (statute covering "claim"). Or
where the object of the action was an injunction. Kiscr '. Do,glas County,
70 Wash. 242, 126 Pac. 622 (1912) (statute covering "claim"); Darvi' v.
City of Appleton, 109 Wis. 580, 85 N. W. 515 (1901) (statute covering
"claim or demand"); Wall r. Salt Lail: City, 50 Utah 593. 168 Pae. 766
(1917) (even though incidental damages were also sought). The instant hold-
ing is based on precedent. Cf. Reining v. City of Buffalo, 102 N. Y. "08,
6 N. E. 792 (1886). But the plaintiff in the Reining case sought damages
only. The prayer for an injunction might have been relied upon to relieve
the plaintiff of the necessity of notice without violating the charter pro-
vision. The language of the court as to the "legal" or "equitable" nature
of a code cause of action seems questionable. See CLAnK, CODE PLEADING
(1928) 49-50.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMIENTS-BONDS---NEGOTIABILITY-REFEP.NCE: TO DEED
OF TRUST.-Three bonds were stolen from the plaintiff and sold to the de-
fendant. Each instrument provided that "This bond is... entitled to the
benefits of and subject to the provisions of a mortgage and deed of
trust. .. ." In a separate sentence reference is made to the mortgage "for
a description of the property mortgaged. and.., the rights of the holders
.. with respect thereto." In an action to recover for their vrongful sale,
judgment was given for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the bonds,
were negotiable as the quoted provisions were merely a reference to the
security. Judgment affirmed. Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 16- N. E.
45 (1929).
A mere reference to a collateral agreement for rights respecting security
does not impair negotiability. Bank of Calfornia v. National City CO., 133
Wash. 517, 244 Pac. 690 (1926) (bonds); Higgins v. Hocking V'allcy Ry..
188 App. Div. 684, 177 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1st Dep't 1919). But otherwise in
the case of a provision that the instrument is "subject to" the terms or con-
ditions of a separate contract, the promise being construed as condition-d
thereby. H2dl v. Angus, 60 Ore. 95, 118 Pac. 284 (1911) (notes "subject
to all the terms and conditions of said mortgage") ; Vc 'ncr v. White, 214
Ala. 550, 108 So. 369 (1926) snmble; King Cattle Co. v. Jose.ph, 158 Minn.
481, 198 N. W. 798, 199 N. W. 437 (1924) (bonds; in addition, the mort-
gage was "made a part hereof"); Aigler, Condition. in Bill.' and Nott s
(1928) 26 MIcH. L. REV. 471, 485; see National Bank of Ncwhrr, v. Wen'-
warth, 218 Mass. 30, 32. 105 N. E. 626 (1914) (distinguishing between "a-
per terms of" and "subject to" the contract). And it seems immaterial
whether the terms or conditions which the instrument is "subject to" would
impair negotiability if written on the face of the challenged instrument.
See Enoch v. Brandon, supra; Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. IRzv. 867; of.
King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, supra. Or whether the terms or conditions have
been fulfilled. Greenbrier Valky v. Bair, 71 W. Va. 684, 77 S. E. 2741
(1913). Contra: Kendall v. Selby, 66 Neb. 60, 92 N. W. 178 (1902). Ac-
cordingly, a note "subject to terms of conditional sales agreement" has, in
New York, been held non-negotiable because the promise to pay was not
"absolute on its face." Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stu.mpel, 247 N. Y. 22, 161
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N. E. 173 (1928); (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 665. There is some difficulty in
reconciling this case with the instant decision. A promise which is "sub-
ject to the provisions of a mortgage" is not absolute on its face, and to hold
that an additional reference to the mortgage "for a description of the prop-
erty mortgaged . . . and the rights . . . with respect thereto" removes the
conditional nature of the promise may well seem a doubtful construction.
On the other hand, business convenience may justify holding some condi-
tional instruments negotiable, and if no category within the Negotiable In-
struments Law can be found for them judicially, legislative action should
be had. Cf. N. Y. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1928) c. 42, §§ 260, 261 (maling
conditional security receipts negotiable) ; Note (1928) 42 HARv. L. Ruv. 115.
Such a step would now be apropos since a revision of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law is being undertaken. See Britton, Proposed Arnwndnients to
Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 815, 818; of. Turner,
Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-INSURANCE-CONDITIONS PREcDENT.-The de-
fendant insurance company had issued a liability policy to H1. The plain-
tiff, having secured a judgment against H, sued to recover the amount of
the judgment from the defendant, alleging that H had duly performed all
the conditions of the policy. The defendant filed a general denial. The
testimony failed to disclose that H had performed any of those conditions
and the trial court gave judgment for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that
the plaintiff could plead compliance with the various conditions precedent
in general terms and that he need only prove compliance with those con-
ditions which the defendant puts in issue. Judgment reversed. Harty v.
Eagle Indemnity Co., 143 Atl. 847 (Conn. 1928).
In a suit on a contract, under the common-law rule, the plaintiff was
forced to allege specially compliance with every condition precedent, and
had the burden of proving such compliance. SHIPMAN, COMiON-LAW
PLEADING (Ballantine's ed. 1923) 249. Where the terms and conditions in
a contract are numerous, code provisions in many states permit the plain-
tiff to allege generally that he has complied with all of them. New Zealand
Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 29 Ga. App. 773, 116 S. E. 922 (1923); CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928) 192. Under such statutes the defendant is usually re-
quired to plead a special denial of the plaintiff's compliance with a specific
condition. Halferty v. Wilmering, 112 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 364 (1885);
National Surety Co. v. Queen City Land & Mortgage Co., 63 Colo. 105, 164
Pac. 722 (1917); Russell v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 121 Me. 248, 110
Atl. 554 (1922). Apparently, however, even in insurance cases, according
to the rule as usually stated, once such plea is made the plaintiff must prove
compliance with those conditions. Cf. Aetna Life Ing. Co. v. Bethel, 140
Ky. 609, 131 S. W. 523 (1910) ; 5 JoYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1918) § 3790.
Some courts have placed the burden of proof on the defendant by treating
certain pleas of breach of condition as affirmative defenses. Shaw, v. Mut-
ual Protective Ins. Co., 9 S. W. (2d) 685 (Mo. App. 1928) (condition of
notice) ; Murphy v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 114 Fed. 404 (C. C. D.
Ind. 1902) (non payments of assessments). The same result is furthered
by a tendency to construe conditions as subsequent whenever possible.
CLARK, le. cit. supra. On the other hand, it has been held that a general
denial by the defendant required the plaintiff to offer evidence of the fur'
nishing of proofs of loss. Steinsultz v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n, 229 Ill.
App. 199 (1923). Similarly a plea of the general issue has been held suffi-
cient to require the plaintiff to prove that the insured had complied with
the condition of "delivery in good health." North British and Mercantile
Ins. Co. v. Lucky Strike Oil & Gas Co., 70 Okla. 146, 173 Pac. 845 (1918). It
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is submitted that the instant case represents the more convenient rule. Fur-
thermore, it is well within the authority of the Connecticut cases, even
though such pleading is not expressly permitted by the code. Hcnntc-cy v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Conn. 699, 52 Atl. 490 (1902) ; see Martwni
v. Mass. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Conn. 519, 521, 138 Atl. 462 (1927).
PRINcIPAL AND AGENT-RESPONSIBILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR Tomnors ACT
OF AGENT-ACT OF BENEFIT SOLELY TO AGENT.-The defendant railroad em-
ployed an agent whose duty it was to give notice to consignees of the ar-
rival of cotton under "order notify" bills of lading. In accordance with a
fraudulent scheme, the agent notified the plaintiff of the arrival of cotton
which in fact had never been shipped. Relying on this information, the
plaintiff paid a draft, the prcceeds of which the agent appropriated for his
own use. In an action brought to recover this amount, judgment was given
for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the defendant was rezponZible for
the acts of its agent committed in the scope of his employment although
motivated by the sole design to benefit himself. Judgment rever.zed. Glca-
son v. Seaboard Ry., 49 Sup. Ct. 161 (U. S. 1929).
When an authorized agent has issued a bill of lading although no goods
have been shipped, most courts have followed the Supreme Court in refus,
ing to hold the railroad responsible. Fricdlandr v. Texas Ry., 1'0 U. S.
416, 9 Sup. Ct. 570 (1889) (action for non-delivery of goods); 1 IdECHEM,
AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 760. Contra: Bank of Batavia v. N. Y. R. R., 106
N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. 433 (1887) (action for wrongful issue of the document).
Section 22 of the Federal Bills of Lading Act provides, however, that "If a
bill of lading has been issued ... by an agent ... whose actual or apparent
authority includes the issuance of bills of lading. .. the carrier shall be
liable . . . for damages caused by the non-receipt of goods" 39 STAT. 342
(1916), 49 U. S. C. § 102 (1926). The Circuit Court of Appeals inferred
from this legislation the intention to leave unehangcd the gcneral rule as to
agents whose authority did not include the issuance of bills of lading, and it
adhered to the implications of the Frkdlandcr case. Gleason v. Scabourd
Ry., 21 F. (2d) 883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927). The instant case overrules the
Friedlaizdcr case to the extent of the implication that there is no responsi-
bility on the principal in tort in the present situation. Whether an action
on the contract itself would lie remains an open question. Cf. Hill v. Union
Trust Co., 108 Pa. 1 (1884) (allowing assumpsit in case of fraudulent cer-
tification of check). In many analogous situations, the principal has been
held responsible in tort. McCord ,. Western Uvion, 39 Alinn. 181, 39 N. W.
315 (1888) (money order message); Ha rens -e. Bank of Tarboro, 132 N. C.
214, 4_3 S. E. 639 (1903) (issuance of stock certificate). But ef. Hztdson
Trust Co. v. Linseed Trust Co., 232 N. Y. 350, 134 N. E. 773 (1922) (agent
must have authority to issue genuine stock certificates). This result ob-
tains in England. Lloyd v. Grace, [1912) A. C. 716 (fraudulent conversion
of customer's securities by solicitor's agent). The instant decision -would
appear commendable since the defendant has placcd its agent in the posi-
tion to do the act complained of, and the actual existence of the conditions
precedent to authorized performance is peculiarly within the agent's own
knowledge. Cf. 2 DIECHEM, op. cit. supra, § 1800; Wichita Ban!: v. Atchccon
T. & S. F. R. R., 20 Kan. 519 (1878) (railroad estopped to deny receipt of
goods).
PROPERTY-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS--RIGHT OF PRIOR GnANTEE UNDER
COMMON GRANTOR TO ENFORCE COVENANTS IN DEED TO SUBSUQUENT
GRANT---The plaintiff and the defendant owned adjoining lots, holding
from a common grantor, who owned other tracts in the same block. The
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grantor had conveyed some of these lots without restrictions. The convey-
ance to the defendant was prior to that to the plaintiff. Both restricted the
use of the property to private dwellings. The plaintiff sought a determina-
tion of the defendant's right to enforce the covenant in the plaintiff's deed.
Held, that the defendant could not enforce the restriction, since there was
no showing of a general plan of restriction. Semple v. Clark, 132 Misc. 903,
230-N. Y. Sujp. 738 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
Where there is a common grantor, a prior grantee may enforce the re-
trictive covenant of a subsequent grantee by showing the existence of a
general building plan. Lacentra v. Valeri, 244 Mass. 404, 138 N. E. 388
(1923); Library Neighborhood Ass'n v. Goosen, 229 Mich. 89, 201 N. W.
219 (1924). Such a plan is not established when restrictions imposed are
not uniform and are not imposed on all lots within the area intended to be
included in the scheme. St. Patrick's Ass'n v. Hale, 227 Mass. 175, 116 N.
E. 407 (1917) ; Enderle v. Leslie Const. Co., 141 At]. 758 (N. J. Eq. 1928).
The absence of any general plan in the instant case might be implied from
the grantor's retention of adjoining property without himself entering into
an agreement similar to that which he exacted from the purchasers. Cf.
Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381 (1872); Osborne v. Bradlcy, [1903] 2 Ch.
446. That similar agreements were exacted from other purchasers does not
of itself show the existence of a general plan. Dime Savings Bank v, But-
lei, 96 Misc. 82, 160 N. Y. Supp. 954 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; Bealmear v. Tippott,
145 Md. 568, 125 Atl. 806 (1924); Pierson v. Canfield, 272 S. W. 231 (Tox.
Civ. App. 1925). In the absence of a general building scheme, the prior
grantee may enforce a covenant of the subsequent grantee by showing that
the restriction was intended for his benefit. Milligan v. Balson, 214 Mo.
App. 627, 264 S. W. 73 (1924) ; Voegler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp., 247
N. Y. 131, 159 N. E. 886 (1928); of. Puddington v. Vielbig, 142 Atl. 171
(N. J. Eq. 1928) ; see Note (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 619, 621. It has been sug-
gested that the later covenants might have been taken in trust for the
earlier grantees. See Note (1912) 12 COL. L. REV. 158, 160; Stone, Rights
of -Strangers to the Contract (1919) 19 COL. L. REV. 177, 186. On the
theory that the covenant was intended to be personal, the grantor alone
might have the right to sue on it, even though he retained no land.
Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913) ; of. Stone, Equitable
Liabilities of Strangers (1918) 18 COL. L. REV. 291, 313; Clark, Easements
and Equitable Restrictions (1928) 38 YAIE L. J. 139, 160. Contra: Amcri-
can Cannel Coal Co. v. Indiana Cotton Mills, 78 Ind. App. 115, 134 N. E.
891 (1922); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 399. The instant
decision is in accord with a modern tendency to look with disfavor upon
restrictions on the use of land and to refuse to enforce them unless clearly
indicated. Cf. Heisler v. Marceau, 116 So. 447 (Fla. 1928); Pacff v. Mar.
gerum, 142 Atl. 6 (N. J. 1928).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-BROKERS-CONTRACT TO PAY COMM1IISSION FRi NEGo-
'TIATION OF LEASE CONTAINING OPTION TO PURCHASE.-A statute made any
contract employing an agent to sell or purchase real estate on commission
S'void" unless evidenced by some memorandum in writing. 1 ORE. LAWS
(Olson, 1920) § 808 (8). The plaintiff was allowed recovery on an alle-
gation that the defendant orally agreed to pay him a commission for nego-
tiating a lease of land and buildings which contained an option to purchase.
Held, on appeal, that this contract was not within the statute. Judgment
reversed on other grounds. Richanbach v. Ruby, 271 Pac. 600 (Ore. 1928).
Statutes similar to the one involved in the instant case have recently been
.adopted in many of the states. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 1973
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(6); MAie. CoMP. LAws (1915) § 11981 (5); N. J. Comp. STAT. (Ann.
Supp. 1924) § 84-10. The result reached by the Oregon court is Eupportcd
by what is apparently the only decision directly in point. KZamer r.
Schmidt, 62 Mont. 568, 206 Pac. 620 (1922) (oral agreement for commis-
sion for procuring assignment of option to purchase land). In holding that
the type of statute in question did not apply to contracts by which brolzers
agree to divide commissions, the California court of appeals further adopted
the view that the statute did not embrace contracts to procure an option.
Howard v. D. W. Hobson Co., 38 Cal. App. 445, 176 Pac. 715 (1918) (Su-
preme Court on rehearing specifically refused to commit itself upon the
second proposition). The reasoning of the instant case emphasized the
technical distinction between an option and a sale. Cf. JAMxES, OPrION CON-
TRACTS (1916) § 401; 1 WARVELLE, VENDORS (2d ed. 1902) § 120. But
there is ample authority to the effect that an oral option upon land is un-
enforceable under the generic statutes of frauds. Lyons v. Ber_-, 103 Ga.
573, 34 S. E. 721 (1899); Hilbcrg v. Gretr, 172 -Mich. 505, 13]8 N. W. 201
(1912) ; Granger Real Estate Exch. v. Ander.son, 1,45 S. W. 262 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912) ; Stewart v. Cadeau, 109 Wash. 292, 186 Pac. 894 (1920). It is
submitted that statutory interpretation here might well have been governed
by an inquiry as to the most effective means of preventing the evils agaimt
which the statute was directed. These were the fraudulent suits for con-
missions, which had previously been numerous and difficult to combat. See
(1928) 4 Wis. L. REV. 379, 380; Covey ev. Henry, 71 Neb. 118, 123, 98 N. W.
434, 435 (1904). The opportunit-y for fraudulcnt commission suits would
appear to be as great in the case of an option as in that of a sale. The atti-
tude of most courts would probably be that such an argument should be ad-
dressed to the legislature.
TA xATiwN-INcomE--DEDUCTION FOR OBsoLscENcE OF GOD WmL. -The
plaintiff, a brewing company, was refused any deduction in its 1919 income
tax for obsolescence of its good will due to the imminence of national pro-
hibition legislation. Section 234 (a) (7) of the Revenue Act of 1918 [40
Stat. 1077 (1919), 26 U. S. C. § 955 (1926)] provides: "that in computing
the net income ... there shall be allowed as dductions: . . . a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property uscd in the trade
or business, including a reasonable allowance for ob:ole.cence. . . ." The
district court refused to confirm the findings of a special master reversing
the collector. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed as good will
is "property" as used in the Act and the deduction therefor should be
allowed. Haberle Crystal Spring B'ewing Co. v. Clark, Colkefor of Inte ;-
nal Reve~ne, -30 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
Two circuits have reached an opposite result on the same state of facts.
Redwbg Malting Co. v. Willcitts, 15 F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926), ccrt.
denied, 273 U. S. 763, 47 Sup. Ct. 476 (1926); Lanzdbcrgcr v. MeLaughn,
26 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). Before the decision in the Rcdzting
case, the Board of Tax Appeals appeared to favor such deductions where
the value of good will could be shown. Apptal of Rock Spring Dirtilling
Co., 2 B. T. A. 207 (1925); Appcal of Northern Hotel Co., 3 B. T. A. 1099
(1925); Appeal of Peter Bieidt Co., 2 B. T. A. 1190 (1925); App, al of
McQuade, 4 B. T. A. 837 (1926). Since this decision these deductions have
been disallowed. Appeal of Manhattan Brewing Co., 6 B. T. A. 952 (1927);
Appeal of Secor Hotel, 7 B. T. A. 158 (1927); Coshland v. Conz . of In.-
ternal Revezze, 7 B. T. A. 680 (1927). Good will is much akin to patents
and copyrights, but differs in that the life of the latter two are strictly
limited by time. Accountants generally concede that both patents and copy-
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rights are subject to depreciation as well as obsolescence. BELL, AUDITING
(1925) 244; 2 FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING (1927) c. 42, pp. 1-3;
COLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCOUNTING (1920) 370; CASTENIIOLZ, Au-
DITING PROCEDURE (1920) 83; MONTGOMERY, AUDITING THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (2d ed. 1917) 123. They generally agree that it is neither necessary
nor desirable to depreciate good will. BELL, op. cit. supra at 242; FINNEY,
op. cit. supra. c. 41, p. 12; COLE, op. cit. supra at 368; CASTENIIOLZ,
op. cit. supra at 79-80; MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra at 123, 427. Some
experts believe that good will does not suffer wear and tear and is not
susceptible to obsolescence. CASTENHOLZ, op. cit. supra at 79-80; MONT-
GOMERY, op. cit. supra at 123. The other authorities mentioned do not
appear to employ the term obsolescence in connection with good will.
But see KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION (1929) 656-660. The adminis-
trative impracticability of evaluating good will seems a cogent objection.
The solution of the question, however, must depend on various economic
factors which would seem to necessitate consideration by the Supreme
Court.
TRADE REGULATION-CLAYTON ACT-ACQUISITION BY A CORPORATION OF
STOCK CONTROL IN A COMPETING COnPORATION.-The X Company, the larg-
est manufacturer of shoes in the United States, acquired nearly all the
capital stock of the Y Company, the largest shoe manufacturer in New
England, at a time when the latter company was in financial straits. The
X Company required additional facilities to fill its orders. It produced a
line of shoes comparable in price and quality to those produced by the Y
Company. The Federal Trade Commission concluded that the purchase of
shares in Y Company violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, which pro-
hibits a corporation engaged in commerce from acquiring shares in another
corporation where the effect may be "to substantially lessen competition."
38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1926). The Commission issued an
order directing the X Company to divest itself of the shares so acquired.
Held, on petition to review, that the order was proper. International Shoo
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 29 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
The courts have sustained orders by the Federal Trade Commission to
corporations to "cease and desist" from holding stock control of competing
corporations in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Federal Trade
Comm. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 175 (1926) ; Alumi-
nurn Co. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm., 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922);
United States v. New Eng. Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass. 1919).
But the Commission has no power to order a corporation to divest itself of
physical assets of another corporation acquired prior to the Commission's
action. Federal Trade Comm. v. Western Meat Co., supra. Where there
is no competition between the products of the companies, unity of control
by stock ownership is legal. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders'
Union, 246 Fed. 851 (S. D. Ohio 1917), rev'd on other grounds, 254 U. S.
77, 41 Sup. Ct. 39 (1920) ; Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Co., 15 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) (suit under Sherman Act).
The mere size of a corporation, or the existence of unexerted power, unac-
companied by unlawful conduct, is no offense. United States v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 47 Sup. Ct. 748 (1927) ; United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1920); United
States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916). The Sherman
Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, has been held to prohibit many
forms of combination and to be applicable to a great variety of trade prac-
tices. Cf. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502
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(1911) ; United States v. Amnerican Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct.
632 (1911); Montague, Anti-Trust Laws and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 1914-1927 (1927) 27 COL. L. R:.v. 650, 664. The Clayton Act is little
more than an interpretation of the broader provisions of the Sherman Act,
and its elaborate detail may easily become a source of confusion. Levy,
The Clayton Law-An Imperfect Supplemcnt to the Sherman, Law (1910)
3 VA. L. REv. 411. The instant case, in construing section 7 of the Clayton
Act strictly, looks solely to the maintenance of competitive conditions. Such
a doctrine, pushed to its logical extreme, would prohibit the merger or con-
solidation of any competing companies. Legislative fiat has not affected the
irresistible economic trend towards industrial consolidation and elimination
of the wastes of unrestricted competition. In applying section 7 of the
Clayton Act the courts might well take cognizance of the purpose of the
acquisition and its effect on the public interest. Cf. Kales, Good and Bad
Trusts (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 830.
WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENCE-BURDEN OF PROOF WHERE CONFIDENTML RE-
L.TiON ExisTE.-The testator devised most of his estate to second and
third cousins, to the exclusion of an uncle who was his next of kin and
sole heir at law. The uncle contested the will, alleging undue influence.
The testator had lived with these beneficiariez, and one of them had man-
aged his property. The lower court instructed the jury that no confidential
relation existed sufficient to shift the burden of proof as to undue influence
to the beneficiary proponents. Held, that the judgment for the proponents
be reversed, on the ground that the lower court should have left to the jury
the issue whether such a confidential relation existed as to "shift the bur-
den of proof" to the proponents. Page v. Phelps, 143 Atl. 890 (Conn. 1928).
In Connecticut the burden of proving undue influence as affecting the
validity of a will rests, in general, on the party asserting it. Goodno v.
Hotchkiss, 88 Conn. 655, 92 Atl. 419 (1914). An exception is made where
the will cuts off "the natural objects of the testator's bounty" in favor of
a stranger who occupied a relation of special confidence and trust to the
testator. In that situation, it has been said that the "burden of proof" is
shifted to the proponents. Cf. Kirby's Appeal, 91 Conn. 40, 98 Atl. 349
(1916). Further statements to the effect that the proponents must disprove
undue influence by "a preponderance of all the evidence" indicate that the
burden of proof is regarded in the prinmary sense of the "risk of non-per-
suasion" and not in the secondary sense of the "duty of producing evi-
dence." See Lockwood v. Lockwood, 80 Conn. 513, 522, 69 Atl. 8, 11 (1903) ;
Kirby's Appeal, supra at 44, 98 Atl. at 350. The view has bcen crit-
icized as violating the generally accepted theory that the "burden of
proof" in the sense of the "risk of non-persuasion" never shifts during the
course of a trial. Comment (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 62; cf. Gifford, Will or
No Will (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 862, 878. Furthermore, the wisdom of put-
ting the "risk of non-persuasion" on beneficiaries in a confidential relation-
ship appears doubtful, as tending to discourage such relationships. Mlany
courts have altered their position or clarified former statements, and have
held that a confidential relationship merely raises a presumption of undue
influence that shifts to the proponent only "the duty of producing evidence."
Matter of Kindberg, 207 N. Y. 220, 100 N. E. 789 (1912); In re Keelez's
Estate, 167 Blinn. 120, 208 N. W. 535 (1926); Madden -e. Keyscr, 331 Ill.
643, 163 N. E. 424 (1928); PAGE, WrLLS (2d ed. 1926) § 710. But cf. Muin-
day v. Knox, 9 S. W. (2d) 960 (Mlo. 1928). The court in the instant case,
repeating the language of previous decisions, placed the burden of proof
in the sense of risk of non-persuasion on the beneficiary. The decision ap-
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pears to mark an extension in that in former decisions the court had
restricted the doctrine of confidential relationships to situations involving
lawyers, physicians, religious advisers, and those in closely analogous re-
lations, and had ruled, in situations similar to the instant one, that it was
error to send the particular issue to the jury, since none of these relations
was to be found. Lockwood v. Lockwood, supra; Gager v. Mathewson, 93
Conn. 539, 107 Atl. 1 (1919).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY TO EMPLOYEE COMMANDEERED IN EX-
ERCISE OF MUNICIPAL POLICE POWER.-A taxicab driver, driving his em-
ployer's cab, was commandeered by a police officer to pursue another car.
While in pursuit, a collision occurred which resulted, in the death of the
driver. Compensation was awarded the estate of the deceased by the State
Industrial Commission under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Held, on
appeal, that the order be affirmed. Matter of Babington v. Yellow Taxi
Corp., 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N, E. 726 (1928).
The basis of Workmen's Compensation statutes is said to be the social ex-
pediency of regarding losses to employees resulting from accidents of in-
dustry as cost items of production which should be borne by the employer
who, in turn, will distribute them among a large group of the community.
Laski, Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 105, 126. Recov-
ery under such statutes is usually limited to losses "arising out of and in
the course of employment." N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1922)
art. 2, § 10. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is based sub-
stantially upon the same theory, the test for imposing responsibilityis whether
there has been an unreasonable deviation from the course of duty of the
employee. TIFFANY, AGENCY (Powell's ed. 1924) 105-110; Smith, Frolic
and Detour (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 716, 724. Whether the employer could
have foreseen this hazard is also a test in these cases. Smith, op. cit. supra
at 727. Both of these tests were used in the instant case. As a basis for
determining the limitations to be placed upon the employer's cost of doing
business they are purely arbitrary. A rational conclusion would require
consideration of the allocation of such losses-the frequency of such occur-
rences, the expediency of imposing the burden on the business and thb abil-
ity of the business to bear the burden. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and
the Administration of Risk I (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584. The loss occurred
during the exercise of the police power by the city. To impose such a lom
on a business is to include in the cost of production an item which would
not seem to belong there. Inasmuch as the employee was acting for the
city at the time of the injury, compensation might be granted by the city.
Cf. Monterey County v. Rader, 199 Cal. 221, 248 Pac. 912 (1926).
